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R
esearch suggests that long-held beliefs on neglected-
disease drug development activity are no longer 
accurate, and that these inaccurate beliefs have 
led—and are leading—to poorly designed and targeted 
government policies and incentives. On a more positive note, 
this research also highlights opportunities for better-targeted 
government policies that will more closely match the reality of 
neglected-disease drug development and the needs of public 
and industry groups.
Current Perceptions
Current government policies to stimulate development of 
new drugs for neglected diseases are based on a set of shared 
understandings.
One of these understandings is that only 13 new drugs have 
been developed for neglected tropical diseases since 1975, 
with the main problem being that these diseases are simply 
non-commercial for companies to invest in [1]. Another is 
that, although public-private partnerships (PPPs) for drug 
development have started, they are problematic. (In this 
article, PPPs are deﬁ  ned as public-health-driven not-for-proﬁ  t 
organisations that drive neglected-disease drug development in 
conjunction with industry groups.) Governments are uncertain 
which of the plethora of PPPs they should support, particularly 
as most are thought to be too young to judge their success. 
At the time this article went to press, the Initiative on Public-
Private Partnerships for Health (http:⁄⁄www.ippph.org/) listed 
92 PPPs in its database (this number includes all PPP activity, 
including the small number of organisations that make drugs, 
vaccines, and microbicides; and one-off partnerings such as 
donations and cut-price deals).
The general view is that PPPs are inexperienced in 
drug development, and may eat up public cash without 
delivering the tools we need, while the real experience 
and capability in drug development lies with multinational 
pharmaceutical companies, which must be brought back 
into the neglected-disease ﬁ  eld if we are to achieve success. 
For example, the Commission for Africa recently stated that 
we need to increase neglected-disease R&D by “giving large 
pharmaceutical ﬁ  rms incentives to investigate the diseases 
that affect Africa, instead of focusing on the diseases of rich 
countries” [2]. 
The logical outcome of these beliefs is to focus on new 
policies to commercialise neglected-disease markets for large 
companies, which seek peak sales of around $500 million per 
year to justify investment. This commercialisation approach 
is generally based on supplementing low developing country 
purchasing power with large—usually billion-dollar—market 
“pull” incentives, such as transferable intellectual property 
rights or advanced purchase commitments underwritten by 
Western governments.
The above all sounds fairly sensible. The only problem is 
that most of the above statements no longer hold true in the 
post-2000 world of neglected-disease drug development, and, 
as a consequence, government policies based on these beliefs 
are at risk of missing the mark.
The 2005 Reality
The landscape of neglected-disease drug development has 
changed dramatically during the past ﬁ  ve years (I am not 
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Figure 1. Active Neglected-Disease Drug Projects by Institution* 
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discussing vaccines, only drugs). There were 63 neglected-
disease drug projects under way at the end of 2004, including 
two new drugs in registration stage and 18 new products 
in clinical trials, half of which were already at Phase III. 
Assuming there is sufﬁ  cient funding, at standard attrition 
rates these projects would be expected to deliver eight to nine 
new neglected-disease drugs within the next ﬁ  ve years, even if 
no further projects were commenced after this time (Figure 
1). This expected yield was calculated using attrition rates 
from the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development 
[3] combined with PPP-speciﬁ  c rates when available. New 
projects have been commenced since the end of 2004, and 
activity is expected to further increase as newer PPPs and 
institutes get into stride. 
This increase in activity is not a passing trend, but is a 
sign of deep-seated structural changes. In particular, it 
reﬂ  ects the formation since 2000 of new pharmaceutical 
industry neglected-disease institutes, now employing over 200 
scientists, and the creation of new drug development PPPs, 
which now conduct three-quarters of all identiﬁ  ed neglected-
disease drug development, sometimes in partnership with 
these industry institutes. 
This renewed activity—at a level unheard of in the past 
two decades—commenced largely in the absence of signiﬁ  cant 
new government incentives and generally without public 
intervention. Eighty percent of PPP drug development activity 
is funded through private philanthropy, while the industry 
institutes are largely self-funding, although sometimes with 
PPP project funding input. (One industry institute did beneﬁ  t 
from generous support from the Government of Singapore.) 
These ﬁ  ndings led the Pharmaceutical R&D Policy Project 
at the London School of Economics, a project funded by the 
Wellcome Trust, to a closer examination: where is this new 
activity centred, what is motivating it, and what has suddenly 
made this “non-commercial” R&D possible? In line with its 
mandate, the project also sought to assess the performance 
of the different actors, in terms of both health outcomes and 
cost-efﬁ  ciency. Our ﬁ  ndings are set out below.
Neglected-Disease R&D Activity
Multinational drug companies now conduct half of new 
neglected-disease drug development activity (32 projects), 
either working with PPPs or working alone (usually with 
a view to subsequent partnering). In all cases, these 
companies are working on a non-commercial basis—that is, 
they are not motivated by commercial returns in neglected-
disease markets—and they have agreed to provide the ﬁ  nal 
products to poor patients in developing countries at not-
for-proﬁ  t prices. The bulk of this activity is accounted for 
by the four companies that have formal neglected-disease 
divisions—GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis, AstraZeneca, and 
Sanoﬁ  -Aventis—while four other companies have less formal 
neglected-disease activity, conducting perhaps one or two 
projects each, and generally on a more serendipitous basis. 
A further half of the identiﬁ  ed 60-plus neglected-disease 
drug projects are conducted by smaller-scale commercial 
ﬁ  rms working with PPPs, including small pharmaceutical 
companies, contract research organisations and developing 
country ﬁ  rms, and academic drug developers. The non-
academic part of this activity is on a purely commercial basis, 
with small ﬁ  rms working on a different scale and being 
motivated by far smaller commercial returns than large 
multinational pharmaceutical companies. PPPs now spend 
as much on small company R&D as they do on multinational 
company projects. The R&D drug landscape for neglected 
diseases is shown in Figure 2.
Three-quarters of all identiﬁ  ed R&D (47 projects) was 
conducted by drug development PPPs, often working with 
the large and small pharmaceutical companies mentioned 
above. Nearly one-third of these projects are at the clinical 
trial stage, including seven drugs now in Phase III trials, and 
two further products are in the registration stage—rectal 
artesunate by the Special Programme for Research and 
Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR) (http:⁄⁄www.who.int/
tdr), and paromomycin by the Institute for OneWorld Health 
(http:⁄⁄www.iowh.org) and TDR. Based on standard attrition 
rates, these PPP portfolios would be expected to yield six to 
seven new neglected-disease drugs within ﬁ  ve years. This is a 
high proportion of the total eight to nine new drugs expected 
from all current avenues. 
Once these data became clear, we were faced with the 
question of why pharmaceutical companies were investing in 
neglected-disease drug development. Current thinking—and 
our own initial beliefs—told us this was impossible without 
new commercial incentives, and no such incentives had been 
introduced. 
Motivations and Facilitating Factors
An examination of the 60-plus neglected-disease projects now 
under way showed that our initial understanding of company 
motivations and PPPs’ role was incorrect. In particular, 
commercial incentives were largely irrelevant to the decision 
by multinational companies to re-enter the neglected-disease 
ﬁ  eld, while small companies involved in neglected-disease 
R&D were indeed responding to existing commercial drivers. 
In most cases, the involvement or planned involvement 
of PPPs was crucial to company activity, commercial or 
otherwise.
Multinational companies. Big companies involved in 
neglected-disease R&D were not motivated by commercial 
returns in the neglected-disease market, but rather by longer-
term business considerations, including: (1) minimising 
the risk to their reputation stemming from growing 
public pressure on companies over their failure to address 
developing country needs; (2) corporate social responsibility 
and ethical concerns; and (3) strategic considerations (for 
example, positioning themselves in emerging developing 
country markets, or building access to low-cost, high-skilled 
developing country researchers).
This renewed neglected-disease activity has been made 
possible by a major structural change in the way multinational 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020302.g002
Figure 2. The R&D Drug Landscape for Neglected Diseases (Dec 2004) 
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companies approach neglected-disease R&D. Instead of 
conducting a limited number of more expensive late-
stage drug development projects (the pre-2000 model), 
companies have moved upstream to the less expensive and 
more innovative drug discovery stages—allowing them to 
control costs and resource inputs to levels more acceptable to 
shareholders. The resulting drug leads can then be developed 
in conjunction with public partners. These public partners 
(usually PPPs) facilitate further development by subsidising 
clinical trial costs; by providing the necessary public health 
skills and developing country knowledge for clinical trials, 
registration, and implementation; and by sharing the risk of 
trials in important but high-liability patient groups, such as 
children and pregnant women. 
This partnering model, sometimes called the “no proﬁ  t–no 
loss model”, allows companies to participate in neglected-
disease research (often providing substantial in-kind inputs) 
while still protecting shareholder value, and manufacturing 
and distributing ﬁ  nal products to developing country patients 
at no mark-up. This has three clear advantages. First, it 
provides a source of high-quality innovative industry drug 
leads. Second, it uses the public health sector in its area 
of maximum comparative advantage (developing country 
clinical trials rather than drug design). Third, it provides ﬁ  nal 
products to poor patients at not-for-proﬁ  t prices.
Small companies. Small companies, on the other hand, 
have largely commercial motivations. Some see neglected-
disease markets, particularly larger markets such as 
tuberculosis (TB) and malaria, as sufﬁ  ciently attractive 
to warrant investment and will pursue these even without 
public support. For example, Zentaris (the small company 
that developed and registered the new anti-leishmaniasis 
drug, miltefosine), noted that: “While such a market would 
be negligible for a big pharmaceutical company, it has a 
good economic scale for us” (personal communication). A 
second—and potentially much larger—category is that of 
small ﬁ  rms that can use “add-on” neglected-disease R&D 
to promote their Western commercial goals. Examples 
of such goals are to expand information on their core 
commercial compounds, or help to establish proof-of-
concept for a technology that can subsequently be transferred 
to commercial markets. These ﬁ  rms generally seek and 
need substantial PPP support, including full cost coverage 
and signiﬁ  cant skills input—and are unlikely to continue 
neglected-disease R&D for developing countries if this 
support is not forthcoming. Finally, commercial contract 
research organisations increasingly see neglected-disease 
R&D as an interesting niche sector, and are now involved on 
a commercial basis in one-third of PPP projects. 
While promising, small company neglected-disease activity 
remains largely under-exploited. Most small companies 
continue to be deterred by the substantial barriers to entry 
that large, disseminated, and unfamiliar developing country 
markets pose, while ﬁ  rms with a primary Western focus can 
have difﬁ  culty concluding ﬁ  nancial agreements with cash-
strapped PPPs, particularly if their intellectual property 
concerns are not adequately addressed. 
PPPs. As noted above, the presence of PPPs is probably 
essential to multinational company participation, and plays 
a catalytic role in encouraging small Western-focussed 
companies to expand their remit to neglected-disease 
indications. However, PPPs also serve other useful functions, 
particularly from the public perspective, including: (1) 
integrating and coordinating multiple industry and academic 
partners and contractors along the drug development 
pipeline; (2) allocating public and philanthropic funds 
to the “right” kinds of R&D projects from a public health 
perspective (for example, since 2000, two-thirds of PPP R&D 
spending has gone directly to industry, almost equally divided 
between large and small companies, while a further one-third 
has been allocated to academics to translate basic research 
into new drug leads); and (3) managing neglected-disease 
drug portfolios, including selection and termination of 
projects based on their relative merits.
By virtue of these functions, PPPs are stimulating 
alternative approaches in addition to “classical” one-to-one 
partnerships with multinational pharmaceutical companies 
(these now represent only about one-third of all PPP 
projects). Their coordinating and integrating role allows 
PPPs to develop compounds from many different sources 
even if there is no interested industry partner. For example, 
the TB Alliance manages and integrates development of 
PA-824 (a Chiron compound that the company itself did 
not want to pursue through the full R&D process) on a 
purely subcontracted basis and without formal development 
partners.
Alternatively, by pairing up small Western companies or 
academics with developing country manufacturers, PPPs 
can—and do—foster a neglected-disease drug development 
pipeline that is far cheaper than the traditional commercial 
approach (see “Cost-efﬁ  ciency” section). Nearly one-
quarter of current PPP projects involve developing country 
pharmaceutical ﬁ  rms as the manufacturing (and sometimes 
development) partner for a range of compounds from 
academia, the public domain, or small ﬁ  rms. For example, 
the Medicine for Malaria Venture’s synthetic peroxide project 
brings together academic discovery and early-development 
partners (Uni Nebraska, Uni Monash, Swiss Tropical 
Institute) with Ranbaxy (India) as the development and trial 
manufacturing partner. 
Performance of the Different Approaches
Although increased neglected-disease R&D is always welcome, 
it is also important that this R&D is targeted to optimal 
health outcomes for developing country patients, and 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020302.g003
Figure 3. PPP Timelines
DNDi, Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative; MMV, Medicines for Malaria 
Venture.
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that it represents the most cost-efﬁ  cient use of public and 
philanthropic funding (that is, that patients see maximum 
health returns for every dollar spent). 
In order to assess performance of the various actors, we 
devised a range of metrics, including health value of the ﬁ  nal 
products (safety, efﬁ  cacy, suitability, and affordability for 
developing country patients), level of innovation, capacity, 
drug development times, cost-efﬁ  ciency, and cost. 
Measurement of the various drug development approaches 
against these metrics showed that both industry working 
alone and public groups working alone performed more 
poorly on most metrics than public–private collaborations. 
In other words—and perhaps unsurprisingly when we 
consider the matter more closely—drug development for 
neglected diseases is optimised by combining industry 
drug development expertise with public neglected-disease 
expertise. Below is a summary of outcomes against a sample 
of metrics.
Health outcomes. The PPP approach delivered the best 
health outcomes for developing country patients. Eight 
neglected-disease projects (Artemotil, Paluther, Coartem 
tablets paediatric label extension, Lapdap, Biltricide, 
Impavido, Ornidyl, and Mectizan) were conducted in public-
industry collaborations (with TDR). Three of the resulting 
products had a major impact on developing country health—
Mectizan (ivermectin), which halved the global burden of 
onchocerciasis between 1990 and 2000 [4]; praziquantel, 
which has helped to control schistosomiasis in Brazil, the 
Mahgreb, the Middle East, China, and the Philippines [5]; 
and the TDR-assisted label extension of Coartem tablets 
for paediatric use, which has delivered Africa its ﬁ  rst safe, 
effective, suitable new anti-malarial for many years. We note 
that praziquantel’s impact was greatly increased by the advent 
of a cheaper, simpler generic formulation by Shin Poong, 
which allowed broader rollout than the originator product, 
Biltricide. 
By contrast, virtually all of the 13 drugs developed by 
industry working alone had a low overall health value for 
developing country patients (although, as noted above, 
industry has now largely moved to a partnering approach), 
with only one drug being widely accessible and useful in 
the developing world (Zentel/albendazole). These 13 
drugs were Zentel, Lariam, Malarone, Mycobutin, Paser, 
AmBisome, Arsumax, Coartem original registration for 
adults and children above 10 kg in a four-dose (not six-
dose) formulation, Halfan, Priftin, Rifampin, Rochagan, 
and Vansil. The chief obstacles to wider developing country 
use of industry-alone drugs were their high price—often 
due to expensive active pharmaceutical ingredients or 
high formulation cost—and their poor suitability to the 
target populations. Examples include the development of 
intravenous formulations suited to Western patients but 
difﬁ  cult in poor-country settings, and exclusion of important 
patient groups, such as children with malaria or HIV-positive 
patients with TB.
Level of innovation and speed of development. 
Incremental innovation can offer marked beneﬁ  ts to 
patients. For instance, ﬁ  xed-dose combinations of existing 
drugs can greatly improve ease of use and compliance; 
follow-on drugs in the same class may improve safety and 
efﬁ  cacy; and paediatric formulations can make childhood 
treatments simpler and more reliable. However, if we are to 
effectively manage health outcomes in the long-term then 
we must also overcome drug resistance, which is a growing 
problem for many neglected diseases, including malaria, 
TB, leishmaniasis, and sleeping sickness. To do so, we 
need to focus R&D on “breakthrough” innovation—that is, 
novel compounds with a novel mechanism of action against 
parasites and microbes—as well as on activities that simplify 
or improve existing therapies from the patient perspective. 
Measurement of the level of “breakthrough” innovation 
under each approach shows that PPPs and industry 
partnering approaches perform best. Nearly half of all PPP 
projects (49%) and more than half of industry partnering 
projects (63%) are in the “breakthrough” category, compared 
to only 8% of drugs developed by industry working alone 
under the pre-2000 model. 
The 8% number should not, however, be compared 
directly with the post-2000 number since the former is 
based on registered drugs while the latter is for a portfolio 
of ongoing projects. Given that R&D of “breakthrough” 
drugs is associated with higher attrition rates, the proﬁ  le 
of ﬁ  nished drugs coming out of the post-2000 portfolio is 
likely to include fewer innovative products. Attrition rates 
alone, however, cannot account for the much higher share of 
breakthrough innovation post-2000. The key explanation for 
this difference is the recent major shift in industry neglected-
disease R&D strategy, as noted above, where the serendipitous 
approach that characterised the past 25 years has given way 
to one that is speciﬁ  cally focussed toward “breakthrough” 
innovation. In the long-term, this approach will only deliver 
high-innovation products, irrespective of attrition rates.
Although the level of innovation is important, it is equally 
important that innovative R&D projects move quickly to bring 
new drugs to patients who need them. Time metrics show 
that PPP drug development trajectories matched or exceeded 
industry standards (based on data from [3] and [6]). In 
particular, they were signiﬁ  cantly faster than public-alone 
drug development (see Figures 3 and 4); and they generally 
exceeded industry trajectories for neglected-disease new 
chemical entities (although the latter are too few in number 
to draw signiﬁ  cant conclusions). 
Cost-efﬁ  ciency. The overall cost-efﬁ  ciency of PPPs was 
superior to other approaches—partly, but not only, due 
to their ability to leverage substantial in-kind inputs from 
partners and by the exclusion of costs of capital from the 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020302.g004
Figure 4. Public Timelines
WRAIR, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research.
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PPP “push” model. The total cost of collective PPP drug 
development activity from 2000 to 2004 (excluding TDR, 
for which numbers were not available) was $112 million, 
including cost of failure for more than 40 projects (ten 
of these in clinical trials, including four at Phase III). 
Conﬁ  dentiality agreements prevent us from disclosing project 
costs in many cases, in particular when company partnerships 
are involved. Full per-project costs were more readily 
disclosed on projects involving academics, developing country 
ﬁ  rms, and paid sub-contractors, and were remarkably low in 
most of the cases we examined. For example, Medicines for 
Malaria Venture’s synthetic peroxide project has moved from 
exploratory, through lead identiﬁ  cation, lead optimisation, 
and pre-clinical, and into Phase I trials at a total cost of $11.5 
million. (Costs of completed projects will, of course, be 
higher.)
The industry cost of developing a new chemical entity 
for Western markets is substantially higher, estimated by 
the Tufts Institute at $802 million per drug including cost 
of failure and cost of capital, and at $403 million for out-
of-pocket R&D costs per drug (including cost of failure) 
[3]. While indicative, these numbers do not hold fully for 
neglected-disease drug development, which some companies 
suggested at interview would be substantially cheaper 
due to lower developing-country trial costs (for example, 
around $50 million to take a new compound from discovery 
through to the start of clinical trials). Even using these lower 
estimates, however, ﬁ  gures to date suggest that PPPs can still 
be expected to perform signiﬁ  cantly better on cost-efﬁ  ciency 
and cost.
Overall performance. It is important to note that these 
outcomes are not evidence of the capacity of the individual 
players, but rather of the ability of different R&D approaches 
to deliver optimal outcomes. A company working in a 
partnership may be able to deliver a better outcome than 
the same company working alone, for a number of reasons. 
Companies working alone (as was generally the case under 
the pre-2000 model) tend to reduce the cost and risk of 
neglected-disease drug development by focussing on less-
expensive, less-risky, “adaptive” R&D such as label extensions 
of veterinary drugs to humans, or new formulations of 
existing drugs, and/or by working slowly, as staff and funds 
are prioritised to more commercial programmes. Under 
the post-2000 partnering model, the same companies can 
still restrict costs and risks but in a far more productive 
way, focussing on discovery of breakthrough leads in the 
knowledge that others are available to help develop these and 
deliver them to patients.
What Does This Mean for Government Policies?
There is a clear disjunct between the reality of neglected-
disease activity and current government thinking, which is 
focussed on “commercialising R&D to bring big companies 
back into the ﬁ  eld”. This thinking is built ﬁ  rmly on the beliefs 
outlined at the start of this report and is now signiﬁ  cantly out 
of kilter with the industry neglected-disease drug landscape. 
Two policy issues stand out. Firstly, there is an urgent 
need to support the new model of neglected-disease drug 
development, in particular the PPP approach, which is 
already generating new drugs, is highly cost-effective, appears 
to offer the highest health value, and is a crucial factor in 
continuing cost-effective industry involvement in neglected-
disease R&D. On this point, we note—and welcome—the 
recent G8 commitment to “increasing direct investment … 
through such mechanisms as Public Private Partnerships … 
to encourage the development of … drugs for AIDS, malaria, 
TB and other neglected diseases” [7]. We look forward to 
seeing the shape of new policies and mechanisms to make 
this commitment concrete, and encourage policy-makers to 
ensure that these are designed to incentivise optimal practices 
within the PPP approach, and to do so in the most cost-
effective manner. Simply handing over cash may not be the 
best way.
Secondly, we suggest that policy-makers review their 
approach to “commercialising” R&D in light of the 
information above. If big companies tell us that public 
“commercial” markets are not a catalysing factor in their 
decision to engage in neglected-disease R&D, then we 
need to listen carefully to them. Policies to stimulate new 
multinational company activity are one thing; policies that 
shift existing industry activity from a not-for-proﬁ  t approach 
to a for-proﬁ  t approach are quite another, and may do so at a 
potential cost of many billions of dollars across all neglected-
disease products. Policy-makers may also want to consider 
whether commercial incentives should be preferentially 
targeted toward smaller companies that have a closer ﬁ  t with 
commercial neglected-disease markets, and whether these 
new incentives should be tailored to encourage industry-
alone R&D, or to encourage partnered models, which metrics 
suggest may deliver a better health outcome. The latter is 
particularly a concern given the relative inexperience of 
most Western pharmaceutical companies (and in particular 
small companies) in later-stage clinical development and 
implementation of tropical disease or TB drugs for use in 
rural Africa or South Asia, as opposed to their undoubted 
experience in developing drugs for large-scale US and 
European disease markets. 
Next Steps
The post-2000 renewal of neglected-disease R&D activity is 
good news for patients with neglected diseases, but it is only a 
beginning. We hope that this closer analysis will contribute to 
our store of information, and allow development of policies 
to encourage and improve these promising new trends in 
neglected-disease drug development.  
A full report of the Pharmaceutical R&D Policy Group study is being 
published by the Wellcome Trust on its Web site to coincide with the 
publication of this article. 
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